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Abstract
We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that
interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has
two phases. In the first phase, the bidders participate in some non-truthful protocol whose output is
itself a truthful protocol. In the second phase, the bidders participate in the truthful protocol selected
during phase one. Note that virtually all existing auctions have either a non-existent first phase (and
are therefore truthful mechanisms), or a non-existent second phase (and are therefore just traditional
protocols, analyzed via the Price of Anarchy/Stability).
The goal of this paper is to understand the benefits of interpolation mechanisms versus truthful mech-
anisms or traditional protocols, and develop the necessary tools to formally study them. Interestingly, we
exhibit settings where interpolation mechanisms greatly outperform the optimal traditional and truthful
protocols. Yet, we also exhibit settings where interpolation mechanisms are provably no better than
truthful ones. Finally, we apply our new machinery to prove that the recent single-bid mechanism of
Devanur et. al. [DMSW15] (the only pre-existing interpolation mechanism in the literature) achieves
the optimal price of anarchy among a wide class of protocols, a claim that simply can’t be addressed by
appealing just to machinery from communication complexity or the study of truthful mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
In a combinatorial auction, a single designer has m items available for purchase to n buyers. Each buyer
has some private valuation function vi(·) : 2[m] → R+ over subsets of items, and the seller aims to partition
the items into S1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Sn so as to optimize the social welfare,
∑
i vi(Si). Much recent work addresses the
design of combinatorial auctions, targeting the desiderata of optimality, simplicity (from both a design and
strategic perspective), and computational tractability. For instance, the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechansim achieves the optimal social welfare, and is truthful (therefore it is strategically simple: no bidder
need consider any strategy except for honest behavior) [Vic61, Cla71, Gro73]. However, in virtually all
settings of interest, the VCG mechanism is not computationally tractable, making it unusable in practice.
Much recent work of computer scientists has targeted the design of auctions that are instead
approximately optimal, but computationally tractable. One active line of work searches for truthful
mechanisms [LS05, DNS05, DNS06, Dob07, DRY11, KV12]. While these results all achieve computational
tractability and strategic simplicity in the strongest possible way, the mechanisms are quite involved and
therefore don’t achieve design simplicity. More importantly, many of these mechanisms can only guarantee
approximation ratios that are polynomial inm. When buyers are assumed to be submodular1 or subadditive,2
the best achieve ratios just logarithmic in m. A central open problem is the design of computationally
tractable truthful mechanisms that guarantee a constant-factor approximation when valuation functions are
submodular or subadditive.
Another exciting line of work has shown simple mechanisms that achieve a low price of anarchy at
various equilibrium concepts [BR11, PLST12, ST12, ST13, FFGL13]. These results show, for instance, that
as long as buyers are subadditive and interact at equilibrium, auctioning each item simultaneously via a first-
price auction achieves half the optimal social welfare [FFGL13]. All of these auctions are computationally
tractable and simple in design, and many achieve approximation ratios that are very small constants, via the
price of anarchy. However, none of the equilibria at which these results hold are known to arise naturally,
and some are even known to be computationally intractable [CP14, DFK15].3 Note that even distributed
regret minimization may be computationally intractable in these settings, as each buyer has exponentially
many (in m) strategies to consider. Therefore, these mechanisms are all extremely complex from a strategic
perspective, as buyers would have to reason about exponentially many different strategies in order to approach
an equilibrium at which good approximation guarantees hold.
So, truthful mechanisms are strategically simple but achieve poor approximation ratios, and simple
mechanisms achieve good approximation guarantees but are strategically complex. As an alternative
to pursuing each direction separately, we propose taking ideas from each and introduce interpolation
mechanisms. An interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, buyers participate in some non-
truthful mechanism whose output is itself a truthful mechanism. In the second phase, buyers participate in
the truthful mechanism selected during phase one. In this language, all truthful mechanisms are interpolation
mechanisms with a non-existent first phase, and the simple mechanisms referenced above are interpolation
mechanisms with a non-existent second phase.
What might interpolation mechanisms bring to the table that truthful mechanisms and existing simple
mechanisms don’t? This question is best addressed with an example. Recent work of Devanur et.
al. [DMSW15] designs the first interpolation mechanism (although they did not consider this classification),
the single-bid mechanism. Phase one of the single-bid mechanism asks each buyer to report just a single real
number, bi, as their bid. Phase two visits the buyers one by one in decreasing order of bi, and allows the buyer
to purchase any number of remaining items at bi per item (so more items are available to higher bidders,
but lower bidders pay less per item). It is easy to see that once the bids are fixed and order determined in
phase one, phase two constitutes a truthful mechanism. Note that phase one by itself is extremely limited:
buyers are asked to represent their entire valuation function (of which there are doubly-exponentially many)
1A valuation function v(·) is submodular if v(X) + v(Y ) ≥ v(X ∩ Y ) + v(X ∪ Y ) for all X, Y .
2A valuation function v(·) is subadditive if v(X) + v(Y ) ≥ v(X ∩ Y ) for all X, Y .
3Some equilibrium concepts, such as a pure Nash equilibrium in simultaneous second price auctions for submodular buyers,
can be found in polynomial time [LLN01, CKS08, DFK15]. However, the algorithms finding them are highly centralized, and
the equilibria themselves are very unnatural: each item only has only one non-zero bidder, even though bidding zero on any
item is possibly a dominated strategy.
with just logm bits. Unsurprisingly, no protocol using this limited amount of communication can possibly
find a good allocation directly. Note also that phase two by itself is also quite limited: an ordering of the
bidders along with a single price is set ahead of time, then buyers do as they please. Also unsurprisingly, such
truthful mechanisms (that we call single-price mechanisms) can’t guarantee any non-trivial approximation
ratio. From our perspective, the single-bid mechanism is interesting because it takes two useless mechanisms,
neither of which can guarantee a sub-polynomial approximation ratio on even 0/1-additive buyers,4 and
combines them into a mechanism with a price of anarchy O(logm) at correlated equilibria when buyers
are subadditive. Importantly, because the per-bidder communication in phase one is only logarithmic, each
bidder can actually implement any standard regret minimization algorithm over possible bids in poly time.
Therefore, the mechanism achieves design simplicity, strategic simplicity, and computational tractability.
The main open problem left following their work is the design of mechanisms that achieve these three
desiderata with a constant price of anarchy.
Interpolation mechanisms are a natural avenue to tackle this problem, and therefore lower bounds on
their capability are important to guide their research. Following Devanur et. al.’s work, questions arose
such as: what if bidders make a constant number of bids instead of just one? What if the posted prices are
different for each item? What if we restrict attention to a much smaller class than subadditive bidders? What
if we consider price of stability instead of anarchy? Surprisingly, a subset of our results shows that none of
these relaxations suffice to (significantly) beat the O(logm) bound attained by the single-bid mechanism.
The remainder of our results show that lower bounds known for various classes of truthful mechanisms also
extend to interpolation mechanisms with little first-phase communication. One should interpret these results
not as claiming that the limits of interpolation mechanisms have already been reached, but as guiding future
research towards other classes of truthful mechanisms (specifically, we identify posted-price mechanisms as
a natural candidate in Section 1.2).
1.1 Our Results
In addition to formally identifying interpolation mechanisms as an important avenue of study, we identify
their connection to the price of anarchy and stability, and provide numerous lower bounds. Our lower bounds
consider interpolation mechanisms where the phase-two mechanism comes from a certain class. The goal
of these lower bounds is to identify which classes of mechanisms are incompatible with interpolation (MIR
and value-query, below), and for which classes of mechanisms the limits have already been reached (single-
price and non-adaptive posted-price, below) to guide future research towards others (adaptive posted-price
mechanisms, Section 1.2). Our results all lower bound the amount of first-phase communication necessary
to find a suitable phase-two mechanism from the desired class. Note that even for truthful mechanisms,
no unconditional communication lower bounds are known outside of artificial settings, so it is outside the
scope of this paper to suddenly provide unconditional lower bounds in the strictly more general setting of
interpolation mechanisms.
Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. Any bidder participating in an interpolation mechanism
with O(logm) first-phase communication per bidder can run any standard regret minimization algorithm in
poly-time. Because bidders need not strategize over their phase-two behavior, they need only optimize over
their possible strategies in phase one, of which there are at most poly(m). Therefore, price of anarchy bounds
for correlated equilibria of interpolation mechanisms with logarithmic first-phase communication have some
extra bite, as bidders can be reasonably expected to converge to a correlated equilibria and the bound will
hold. We call such mechanisms a priori learnable, and formally define this in Section 2.
Because we lower bound the first-phase communication complexity, we not only lower bound the
achievable price of anarchy by such mechanisms, but also the price of stability. In this context, our bounds
are strong in the sense that they don’t rely on equilibrium behavior of the buyers, and apply no matter how
the buyers interact. Prior to this work, Roughgarden provides the only general approach for proving price of
anarchy lower bounds [Rou14], and no general approach was known for price of stability at all. Our approach
is similar to Roughgarden’s in the sense that both identify settings in which communication lower bounds
4A buyer is additive if they have a value vi for item i, and their value for a set S is
∑
i vi. A buyer is 0/1-additive if each
vi ∈ {0, 1}.
imply “the right” price of anarchy lower bounds. Still, our approach differs signifcantly as Roughgarden’s
work specifically targets equilibrium concepts that are not efficiently computable, and doesn’t apply to price
of stability. We discuss formally the connection between first-phase communication bounds and price of
anarchy/stability in Section 2.
Single-Price Mechanisms. A single-price mechanism fixes a price pi for buyer i, then visits the buyers
one at a time and offers buyer i any remaining items for pi each. Devanur et. al.’s single-bid mechanism
has O(logm) first-phase communication per bidder, and obtains a price of anarchy at correlated equilibria
of O(logm) whenever buyers are subadditive. We show in Section 3 that even when buyers are just additive,
no amount of first-phase communication suffices for an interpolation mechanism whose second phase is a
single-price mechanism to obtain an approximation ratio o(logm/ log logm). Note that this significantly
improves a lower bound shown in [DMSW15], which simply proved that the single-bid mechanism itself
could not guarantee an approximation ratio o(logm/ log logm).
Non-Adaptive Posted-Price Mechanisms. Non-adaptive posted-price mechanisms generalize
single-price mechanisms by allowing the mechanism to set a price pij for buyer i to purchase item j. The
mechanism still visits the buyers one at a time, and allows buyer i to purchase any remaining items at the
designated price. We show in Section 4 that even when buyers are just additive, any interpolation mechanism
whose second phase is a non-adaptive posted-price mechanism and guarantees an o(logm/ log logm) approx-
imation ratio has Ω(m1−ǫ) first-phase communication per bidder, for all ǫ > 0. Therefore, the single-bid
mechanism cannot be improved by restricting attention to a smaller class of valuations, restricting attention
to a smaller class of equilibrium concepts, setting different prices for different items, or allowing significantly
more (but still sublinear) first-phase communication.
Maximal-In-Range, Value Query, and Computationally Efficient Mechanisms. Several recent
works have identified lower bounds on approximation ratios that can possibly be obtained by these classes of
mechanisms, which we will define in the corresponding sections. We extend these lower bounds to mechanisms
with low first-phase communication that induce a mechanism in one of these classes. In Section 5, we extend
techniques of Daniely et. al. based on generalizations of the VC-dimension [DSS15], and in Section 6, we
extend the techniques of Dobzinski and Vondrak based on structured sub-menus [Dob11, DV12].
1.2 Discussion and Future Work
Motivated by impossibility results associated with truthful mechanisms, and concerns regarding the strategic
simplicity of existing simple mechanisms analyzed via price of anarchy, we propose the study of interpolation
mechanisms. Using this new notion, we show that the single-bid mechanism of Devanur et. al. [DMSW15]
is essentially optimal for its class, even subject to quite significant generalizations. We note that, prior to
our work, it was unclear even how to define a class containing this mechanism, let alone prove lower bounds
against mechanisms “like this.” We also identify several classes of truthful mechanisms that are incompatible
with interpolation in the sense that low first-phase communication doesn’t allow for better approximation
guarantees than no first-phase communication.
Our work identifies adaptive posted-price mechanisms (where the mechanism may choose what prices to
set based on what items have already sold) as an intriguing class of mechanisms to study with interpolation,
as none of the lower bounds from this work apply. Furthermore, Dynkin’s secretary algorithm [Dyn63]
immediately implies an adaptive posted-price mechanism that gets a 1/e approximation for additive bidders,
so mild adaptations of our lower bounds for non-adaptive posted-price mechanisms are unlikely to apply. Can
an interpolation mechanism with O(logm) per bidder first-phase communication and an adaptive posted-
price mechanism for its second phase guarantee a constant price of anarchy?
Our results also fit into a line of work designing combinatorial auctions with low price of anarchy via
valuation compression [DFP11, HS13, DFP14, BLNL14]. These mechanisms restrict the allowable valuation
reports from buyers to a space where the VCG mechanism is computationally tractable, even though the
buyers may have much more complex valuations. In our context, these mechanisms still consist of just a first
phase, and therefore rich valuation classes (like submodular, subadditive, or even just additive) cannot be
compressed all the way down to a class that can be indexed with just O(logm) bits without super-constant
loss. On this front, interpolation mechanisms provide a new style of two-phase valuation compression where
this level of compression may be attainable.
Additionally, many existing truthful auction formats are naturally parameterized by parameters that are
assumed to be known to the designer (e.g. buyers’ budgets in a clinching auction [GML12, GML13, GML14]
or buyers’ interest sets in single-minded combinatorial auctions). Our framework provides a natural extension
of such mechanisms to settings where these parameters are instead private. For instance, one could take
any clinching auction where the budgets are assumed to be known, and add a first phase where buyers are
asked to report their private budget. It would be very interesting to analyze the price of anarchy of such
interpolation mechanisms, as these parameters are often not public knowledge in practice.
Finally, while we were motivated to study interpolation mechanisms for welfare maximization in
combinatorial auctions, interpolation will also be useful in any setting where unfortunate lower bounds
are known for truthful mechanisms but strategic simplicity is still a concern. A natural generalization of
the presented setting, which we omit due to space constraints, is a model where rounds of truthful and
non-truthful interaction might be interleaved (instead of having all non-truthful interaction come before all
truthful interaction). It would be interesting to understand the power and complexity of such mechanisms
in settings beyond necessarily just combinatorial auctions.
2 Preliminaries
In a combinatorial auction, the designer has m items to allocate to n buyers. Each item can be allocated to
at most one buyer, and the buyers can be charged any non-negative price. Agents have a valuation function
vi(·) mapping subsets of items to non-negative real values. Agents are quasi-linear, meaning that their utility
for receiving items Si and paying price pi is vi(Si) − pi. The designer’s goal is to select an allocation that
(approximately) maximizes the welfare,
∑
i vi(Si).
A mechanism is truthful if it is in every buyer’s interest to tell the truth, no matter their type. Formally,
if pi(~v) denotes the expected price paid by buyer i when the reported types are ~v, and Si(~v) denotes the
(possibly random) set that buyer i receives, then we must have:
ESi←Si(~v)[vi(Si)]− pi(~v)
≥ ESi←Si(~v−i;v′i)[vi(Si)]− pi(~v−i; v
′
i), ∀i, ~v−i, vi, v
′
i.
We define various classes of mechanisms and subclasses of valuation functions within the following
sections.
2.1 Interpolation Mechanisms
An interpolation mechanism is a communication protocol with two phases. The first phase is non-truthful,
and the output is a truthful mechanism. The second phase is the truthful mechanism output in phase one,
and the output is an allocation of items and prices to charge.
Definition 1. (Interpolation Mechanism) Let M denote the space of all truthful mechanisms for a
combinatorial auction setting. Note that the output space of all M ∈ M is an allocation of items and
charged prices. An interpolation mechanism provides a communication protocol, P , that outputs a mechanism
M ∈ M based on the transcript of P . In phase one, bidders participate in the protocol P . In phase two,
bidders participate in the truthful mechanism output by P during phase one. After phase two, the items are
allocated and prices charged according to the bidders’ play of the phase two mechanism. If the second phase
of an interpolation mechanism always lies inside a restricted class C of truthful mechanisms, then we call
this a “C interpolation mechanism.”
Our main results provide lower bounds on the per-bidder communication necessary during the first
phase in order to possibly select a good truthful mechanism for the second phase. Formally, we say that
an interpolation mechanism guarantees an approximation ratio of c when buyers have types in V if for all
i, vi ∈ V , there exists a phase-one strategy for buyer i, si(vi), such that for all ~v ∈ Vn, if buyers use the
strategies si(vi) during phase one, and report truthfully during phase two, the resulting allocation obtains a
1/c-fraction (in expectation) of the optimal social welfare for ~v.
Note that this approximation guarantee is not tied to any particular equilibrium concept. It is strictly
easier to design an interpolation mechanism that guarantees an approximation ratio of c than one that has a
price of anarchy/stability of c (stated formally in the following section), so lower bounds on the approximation
ratio imply lower bounds on attainable price of anarchy/stability.
Of specific interest are interpolation mechanisms that have poly(n,m) total communication, and only
require bidders to consider poly(m) strategies. Note that bidders must, at least a priori, consider every
possible strategy during phase one (but need only consider telling the truth during phase two). So in order
to guarantee that bidders have at most poly(m) strategies to consider, the first phase must be especially
simple.
Definition 2. (a priori learnable) We say that an interpolation mechanism is a priori learnable if the first
phase contains a single simultaneous broadcast round of communication, and the per-bidder communication
is O(logm).5
Observation 1. Any buyer can run any standard regret minimization algorithm (for instance, Multiplicative
Weights Updates) over her strategies in an a priori learnable interpolation mechanism in time/space poly(m).
Therefore, a correlated equilibrium of any a priori learnable interpolation mechanism can be found in poly-
time, and correlated equilibria arise as the result of poly-time distributed regret minimization.
Proof. As the second phase is a truthful mechanism, each buyer need not strategize over possible actions
during the second phase. Therefore, buyers should always play their dominant strategies during phase two
and need only learn over their strategies during phase one; this can only decrease their regret. As phase
one is a normal form game and there are only poly(m) such strategies, each buyer can just run a standard
regret minimization algorithm in time/space poly(m). If each buyer does this, their play will converge to a
correlated equilibrium [FV97, HMC00]. ✷
Note that price of anarchy bounds for correlated equilibria in a priori learnable interpolation mechanisms
have more bite than price of anarchy bounds for solution concepts that don’t arise naturally. The single-bid
mechanism, for instance, is a priori learnable.
2.2 Connection to Price of Anarchy and Stability
The main application of our first-round communication lower bounds is on the price of anarchy or stability
achievable for any a priori learnable interpolation mechanism. Price of anarchy/stability is typically defined
for the social welfare, but has recently been considered also for revenue [HHT14], and is well-defined for
more general objectives as well. The observation below holds for any objective, but we state it for social
welfare in combinatorial auctions since that is the focus of this paper.
Definition 3. Let E denote any solution concept (i.e. Nash equilibria) for the mechanism M , and V denote
any set of valuation functions. Then the price of anarchy (PoA) and Price of Stability (PoS) of M with
respect to E when buyers have valuations in V are:
PoA = max
~v∈Vn
maxS1⊔...⊔Sn{
∑
i vi(Si)}
min~s∈E{ES1,...,Sm←M(~s)[
∑
i vi(Si)]}
.
PoS = max
~v∈Vn
maxS1⊔...⊔Sn{
∑
i vi(Si)}
max~s∈E{ES1,...,Sm←M(~s)[
∑
i vi(Si)]}
.
Observation 2. If an interpolation mechanism has price of anarchy or price of stability α at any non-
empty equilibrium concept, then that same interpolation mechanism guarantees an approximation ratio of α.
Therefore, lower bounds on the approximation ratios of interpolation mechanisms imply lower bounds on the
possible price of anarchy/stability obtainable by those same mechanisms.
Proof. Just sample each strategy si(vi) from any equilibrium where the price of anarchy/stability holds.
This strategy immediately witnesses that the interpolation mechanism guarantees an α-approximation. ✷
5Note that, for instance, a single simultaneous broadcast round of poly(m) communication per bidder results in exponentially
many strategies (as in simultaneous first or second price auctions).
3 Single-Price Mechanisms
In this section, we consider single-price mechanisms. A single-price mechanism visits bidders one at a time
and offers the current bidder the opportunity to buy any number of remaining items at pi per item. The
main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 3.1. There exist profiles of additive buyers for which the best single-price mechanism achieves
an Ω(logm/ log logm)-approximation. Therefore, for all C > 0, no single-price interpolation mechanism
with first-round communication C per bidder obtains an o(logm/ log logm)-approximation on all profiles of
additive buyers. This holds even when each buyer values each item at an integer between 1 and m.
Proof. Consider the following example. There are b buckets of items (indexed from 0 to b− 1), with bucket
i containing cb−i items, for some constants b, c to be set later. The value of (almost) every bidder for each
item in bucket i is ci. Each item is “special” for exactly one bidder, who values it instead at ci+1. Each
bidder has exactly cb−i/n special items in bucket i. It is clear that the optimal allocation in this instance is
to award each bidder each of their special items, which has welfare bcb+1.
Now consider any single-price mechanism, with prices p1, . . . , pn. We want to consider when bidder i
will get his special items in bucket j. Notice that bidder i’s special items in bucket j are available to her if
and only if pk > c
j for all k < i. Bidder i will choose to purchase her special items in bucket j if and only if
pi ≤ cj+1.
So for each bucket j, let ij denote the first bidder for which pi ≤ cj (w.l.o.g. such a bidder exists as it
is always optimal to set pn = 0), and nj denote the number of bidders before i whose price is at most c
j+1.
Then the number of bidders who get their special items in bucket j is exactly nj + 1. So the total number
of pairs (i, j) such that bidder i gets her special items in bucket j is exactly b+
∑b
j=1 nj . It’s also clear that∑b
j=1 nj ≤ n, as pi ∈ (c
j , cj+1] for at most one j. So the number of pairs (i, j) such that bidder i gets her
special items in bucket j is at most b+ n.
Finally, observe that if the number of pairs (i, j) such that bidder i receives her special items in bucket
j is x, then the welfare is exactly xcb+1/n+ (bn− x)cb/n, which achieves at most a ( xnb +
1
c )-fraction of the
optimal welfare. Plugging in for x = n+ b, this is a 1/(1/n+ 1/b+ 1/c)-approximation.
Setting b = c = n provides an example with m = Θ(nn) items (so n = Θ(logm/ log logm)) for which no
single-price mechanism obtains an o(n) = o(logm/ log logm)-approximation.
✷
Notice that the impossibility above is quite strong: no amount of communication suffices to find a
good single-price mechanism (because it is possible that one simply doesn’t exist). This greatly strengthens
an inapproximability result of [DMSW15], which just shows that their specific procedure (the single-bid
mechanism) for selecting one doesn’t obtain a better approximation ratio.
Corollary 3.1. No single-price interpolation mechanism obtains a price of anarchy or price of stability
o(logm/ log logm) at any solution concept that is guaranteed to exist on all profiles of additive buyers.
4 Non-Adaptive Pricing Mechanisms
In this section, we consider non-adaptive posted-price mechanisms. A non-adaptive posted-price mechanism
orders the bidders however it wants (possibly randomly), then selects a price vector ~pi for each bidder i.
The bidders are visited one at a time, and offered the opportunity to purchase any subset Si of remaining
items for price
∑
j∈Si
pij . The main result of this section is below. Our proof uses the probabilistic method,
which has also been used in [DK15] to prove price of anarchy lower bounds.
Theorem 4.1. Any non-adaptive posted-price interpolation mechanism that guarantees an approximation
ratio of o(logm/ log logm) on all profiles of additive bidders has first-round communication at least m1−ǫ
per bidder, for all ǫ > 0. This holds even when each buyer values each item at an integer between 1 and m.
Proof. We will use the probabilistic method to define a set of profiles of additive bidders such that no non-
adaptive posted-price mechanism does well on much of the set. Let each ~vj (the vector of values of each
bidder for item j) be drawn independently, and be equal to a random permutation of (ck+1, ck, . . . , ck) with
probability 1/ck for each k ∈ {1, . . . , b}, and (0, . . . , 0) with probability 1−
∑b
k=1 1/c
k for constants c ≥ 2, b
to be set later.
It is clear that the expected maximum value per item is exactly bc, so the expected optimal welfare is
bcm. Consider now any non-adaptive posted-price mechanism, and restrict attention to prices for item j. For
each k, let ik denote the first bidder such that pikj ≤ c
k, and nk denote the number of bidders before ik such
that pij ≤ ck+1. Then the probability that this mechanism awards the item to the “special” bidder when the
profile is a random permutation of (ck+1, ck, . . . , ck) is exactly 1+nkn . Therefore, the expected welfare of this
posted-price mechanism, just considering contributions from item j, is
∑b
k=1 c(1 + nk)/n+ (n− 1− nk)/n.
It is also clear that
∑b
k=1 nk ≤ n, as each pij ∈ (c
k, ck+1] for at most one k. So the expected welfare per
item of this non-adaptive posted-price mechanism is at most cb/n+ c+ b, and the total expected welfare is
at most (cb/n+ c+ b)m.
Because the values for each item are drawn independently, the optimal welfare and the welfare of this
non-adaptive posted-price mechanism is the sum of m independent random variables, each in [0, cb+1].
Therefore, we can use the Chernoff bound to bound the probability that these random variables deviate
from their expectation.
Set b = c = n. Then the probability that the welfare of any fixed item pricing exceeds 2(3n)m is at
most e−m/n
n
. The probability that the optimal welfare is less than (n2m)/2 is at most e−m/(4n
n−1). So
consider any set P of at most 2m/n
n
different non-adaptive posted-price mechanisms. Taking a union bound
over all mechanisms M ∈ P , we see that with non-zero probability, the welfare of M is at most 6nm while
the optimal welfare is at least n2m/2. Therefore, there exists a profile of additive bidders for which no
mechanism in P is an n/12-approximation.
If the first-round communication of each player is at most m/nn+1, then there are only 2m/n
n
possible
transcripts from the first round, and therefore only 2m/n
n
different non-adaptive posted-price mechanisms
can possibly result. By the above reasoning, this implies the existence of a profile for which every possible
mechanism selected (and therefore every outcome selected by the protocol) does not obtain an n/12-
approximation. For any fixed ǫ, setting m = nn/ǫ yields an instance with n = Θ(ǫ logm/ log logm) that
requires m1−ǫ first-round bits per bidder to optain an n/12 approximation. ✷
Interestingly, there is always a non-adaptive posted-price mechanism that allocates the items optimally:
set pij = maxi′ 6=i vi′j for all i, j. Each vi′j can be communicated with logm bits, so the entire mechanism can
be found with m logm bits of communication per bidder. The theorem states that sublinear communication
doesn’t suffice to find a very good mechanism.
Corollary 4.1. No a priori learnable non-adaptive posted-price interpolation mechanism obtains a price
of anarchy or price of stability o(logm/ log logm) at any solution concept that is guaranteed to exist on all
profiles of additive buyers.
5 Maximal-In-Range Mechanisms
In this section, we consider maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanisms. A maximal-in-range mecha-
nism selects some subset F ′ ⊆ 2[n]×[m] of feasible allocations, and always selects an outcome in
argmaxx∈F ′{Welfare(x)} (where the welfare is computed with respect to the valuation profile). In other
words, a maximal-in-range mechanism always optimizes welfare exactly over a restricted set of possible
outcomes. We provide a mild generalization of the techniques of Daniely et. al. [DSS15] that apply to
MIR interpolation mechanisms rather than just MIR mechanisms. With these new techniques, we show the
following theorem. All proof details are in Appendix B for space considerations.
Theorem 5.1. For all δ > 0, the following hold:
• Assuming NP ( P/poly, any poly-time (runs in time poly(n,m)) MIR interpolation mechanism
that obtains an approximation ratio m1/3−2δ/3 whenever buyers are single-minded6 has first-round
communication at least mδ per bidder.
6A valuation function v(·) is single-minded if there is a special set S and v(T ) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T , and vi(T ) = 0 otherwise.
• Assuming NP ( P/poly, any poly-time (runs in time poly(n,m)) MIR interpolation mechanism
that obtains an approximation ratio m1/3−δ/5 whenever buyers are capped-additive7 has first-round
communication at least m1/3 per bidder.
• Any poly-communication (total communication poly(n,m)) MIR interpolation mechanism that obtains
an approximation ratio m1/3−δ whenever buyers are submodular8 has first-round communication at
least m1/3 per bidder.
Corollary 5.1. Assuming NP ( P/poly, no a priori learnable, computationally efficient MIR interpo-
lation mechanism obtains a price of anarchy or price of stability o(m1/3) at any solution concept that is
guaranteed to exist on all profiles of single-minded buyers, capped-additive buyers, or submodular buyers.
6 Value Query and Computationally Efficient Mechanisms
In this section, we consider value query mechanisms and arbitrary computationally efficient mechanisms.
A mechanism is a value query mechanism if it only interacts with buyer valuations with queries of the
form: “what is your value for set S?” A computationally efficient mechanism is any mechanism that
terminates in polynomial time in m,n, and the space it takes to describe a valuation function. Note that
for single-minded and capped-additive functions, the space required is also poly(m,n), but for submodular
functions the space required may be larger. We provide a mild generalization of techniques of Dobzinski
and Vondrak [Dob11, DV12] that apply to interpolation mechanisms rather than just truthful mechanisms.
With these new techniques, we show the following theorem. All proof details are in Appendix C for space
considerations.
Theorem 6.1. For all δ > 0, the following hold:
• Any value query interpolation mechanism that makes at most e
m1/3
10m8 −1 queries that obtains an approx-
imation ratio m1/3−δ/20 whenever buyers have submodular valuations has first-round communication
at least mδ per bidder.
• Assuming RP 6= NP , any computationally efficient interpolation mechanism that obtains an approxi-
mation ratio m1/3−δ/20 has first-round communication at least mδ per bidder.
Corollary 6.1. Assuming RP 6= NP , no a priori learnable computationally efficient mechanism or a
priori learnable value query mechanism that makes at most e
m1/3
10m8 − 1 queries guarantees a price of anarchy
or price of stability o(m1/3) at any solution concept that is guaranteed to exist on all profiles of submodular
buyers.
References
[BDF+10] David Buchfuhrer, Shaddin Dughmi, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Elchanan Mossel, Christos H. Papadim-
itriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer, and Christopher Umans. Inapproximability for VCG-Based Combina-
torial Auctions. In Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
(SODA), 2010. B.2
[BLNL14] Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, and Renato Paes Leme. On the efficiency of the walrasian
mechanism. In the 16th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2014. 1.2
[BR11] Khsipra Bhawalkar and Tim Roughgarden. Welfare guarantees for combinatorial auctions with item bidding.
In SODA, 2011. 1
[CKS08] George Christodoulou, Annama´ria Kova´cs, and Michael Schapira. Bayesian combinatorial auctions. In
ICALP, 2008. 3
[Cla71] Edward H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, pages 17–33, 1971. 1
[CP14] Yang Cai and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity.
In ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC ’14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014, pages
895–910, 2014. 1
7A valuation function v(·) is capped-additive if there is a budget b such that v(S) = min{b,
∑
j∈S v({j})}.
8A valuation function v(·) is submodular if v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ) ≤ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T .
[DFK15] Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, and Robert Kleinberg. On the complexity of computing an equilibrium in
combinatorial auctions. In the 26th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2015. 1,
3
[DFP11] Paul Du¨tting, Felix Fischer, and David C. Parkes. Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design.
In the 13th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2011. 1.2
[DFP14] Paul Du¨tting, Felix Fischer, and David C. Parkes. Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position
auctions. In the 16th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2014. 1.2
[DK15] Paul Du¨tting and Thomas Kesselheim. Algorithms against anarchy: Understanding non-truthful mecha-
nisms. In the 17th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2015. 4
[DMSW15] Nikhil Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and S. Matthew Weinberg. Simple auctions with
simple strategies. In the 17th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2015. (document), 1,
1.1, 1.2, 3
[DNS05] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial
auctions with complement-free bidders. In Proceedings of the thirty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory
of computing, pages 610–618. ACM, 2005. 1
[DNS06] Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, and Michael Schapira. Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial
auctions. In Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 644–652.
ACM, 2006. 1
[Dob07] Shahar Dobzinski. Two randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 10th
International Workshop on Approximation and the 11th International Workshop on Randomization, and
Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques, pages 89–103, 2007. 1
[Dob11] Shahar Dobzinski. An Impossibility Result for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular
Valuations. In Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2011. 1.1, 6,
C, 10, 11, C.2, C.2, C.2
[DRY11] Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden, and Qiqi Yan. From convex optimization to randomized mechanisms:
Toward optimal combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 43rd ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing
(STOC), 2011. 1
[DSS15] Amit Daniely, Michael Schapira, and Gal Shahaf. Inapproximability of truthful mechanisms via generaliza-
tions of the vc dimension. In STOC 2015: 47th Annual Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2015. 1.1, 5,
B, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, B.2, B.1, B.2, 5, B.2
[DV12] Shahar Dobzinski and Jan Vondrak. The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial
Auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2012. 1.1, 6, C, C.2, C.2
[Dyn63] EB Dynkin. The optimum choice of the instant for stopping a markov process. In Sov. Math. Dokl, volume 4,
pages 627–629, 1963. 1.2
[FFGL13] Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, and Brendan Lucier. Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient.
In Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 201–210. ACM, 2013.
1
[FV97] Dean P Foster and Rakesh V Vohra. Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium. Games and Economic
Behavior, 21(1):40–55, 1997. 2.1
[GML12] Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, and Renato Paes Leme. Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords
polytope. In the 44th annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (STOC), 2012. 1.2
[GML13] Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, and Renato Paes Leme. Clinching auctions with online supply. In the 23th
Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2013. 1.2
[GML14] Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, and Renato Paes Leme. Clinching auctions beyond hard budget constraints.
In the 16th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC), 2014. 1.2
[Gro73] Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, pages 617–623, 1973. 1
[HHT14] Jason Hartline, Darrell Hoy, and Sam Taggart. Price of anarchy for auction revenue. In ACM Conference
on Economics and Computation, EC ’14, Stanford , CA, USA, June 8-12, 2014, 2014. 2.2
[HMC00] Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium.
Econometrica, 68(5):1127–1150, 2000. 2.1
[HS13] Paul Du¨tting Monika Henzinger and Martin Starnberger. Valuation compressions in vcg-based combinatorial
auctions. In Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE), 2013. 1.2
[KV12] Piotr Krysta and Berthold Vo¨cking. Online mechanism design (randomized rounding on the fly). In
Automata, Languages, and Programming, pages 636–647. Springer, 2012. 1
[LLN01] Benny Lehmann, Daniel Lehmann, and Noam Nisan. Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal
utilities. In the 3rd Annual ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC), 2001. 3
[LS05] Ron Lavi and Chaitanya Swamy. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In
Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2005. 1
[PLST12] Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, and E´va Tardos. Sequential auctions and externalities. In SODA,
2012. 1
[Rou14] Tim Roughgarden. Barriers to near-optimal equilibria. In FOCS, 2014. 1.1
[ST12] Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. Bayesian sequential auctions. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce, pages 929–944. ACM, 2012. 1
[ST13] Vasilis Syrgkanis and Eva Tardos. Composable and efficient mechanisms. In STOC, 2013. 1
[Vic61] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, pages
8–37, 1961. 1
A A Second Round is Necessary
In this section, we show that indeed something is gained by including a second round, if the goal is a
priori learnability. Specifically, we show that just a low amount of first-round communication (but no
truthful communication) can’t beat a poly(m)-approximation. One should contrast this with the single-
bid mechanism of Devanur et. al. which shows that exponentially less first-round communication plus a
single-price mechanism obtains an O(logm)-approximation.
Theorem A.1. For all ǫ > 0, consider any (not necessarily truthful) protocol for combinatorial auctions with
communication complexity O(mǫ) per party. Then this protocol does not guarantee an approximation ratio
better than m1/2−ǫ on all instances with 0/1-additive buyers. This bound holds against non-deterministic
and randomized protocols as well.
Proof. Let n = 2m1/2−ǫ. Consider the following random valuation: Each item interests only one bidder
chosen uniformly randomly and also independently from other items. Each bidder values items they are
interested in at 1, and all others at 0.
For any fixed allocation, let’s define Xi to be the indicator variable that item i is assigned to the bidder
who is interested in this item. Then the total welfare of this allocation can be defined as X =
∑n
i=1Xi. It’s
easy to see that E[X ] = m/n, and that the optimal allocation has welfare m. By Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[X ≥ 2E[X ]] ≤ e−E[X]/3 = e−m
1/2+ǫ/6.
Since each party communicates only O(mǫ) bits, the mechanism uses at most 2n·O(m
ǫ) different allocations.
And from the above probabilistic argument, we know that each allocation can only obtain a m1/2−ǫ with
probability e−m
1/2+ǫ/6 on the random valuations described above. For all ǫ > 0, when m is large enough,
2n·O(m
ǫ) × e−m
1/2+ǫ/6 < 1/m.
We know that the protocol can’t possibly get an m1/2−ǫ approximation on all additive valuations. Because
we only counted the number of transcripts, this holds against non-deterministic protocols as well.
In fact, we have also shown that the probability that any set of 2n·O(m
ǫ) allocations achieves welfare
larger than m1/2+ǫ is at most 1/m. Clearly, no allocation can achieve welfare larger than m, so we have also
shown that the expected welfare of any set of 2n·O(m
ǫ) allocations is at most m1/2+ǫ on this distribution as
well. Now we can apply Yao’s minimax principle to claim that no randomized protocol beats welfare m1/2+ǫ
on all instances generated by our probabilistic construction. Therefore, no randomized protocol guarantees
a m1/2−ǫ-approximation on all instances of 0/1-additive buyers. ✷
B Omitted Proofs from Section 5
In this section, we provide a proof of Theorem 5.1. Our proof technique is based on techniques developed
in [DSS15]. In [DSS15], they present a generalization of VC dimension and used it to unify all previous
inapproximability results for maximal-in-range mechanisms.
Proof overview: We will first show that if the first-round communication C ≤ mδ, then the auctioneer
is choosing a truthful mechanism from exponentially many but not too many maximal-in-range mechanisms.
And then we generalize the results in [DSS15] to show that if the mechanism is potentially running a bounded
number of maximal-in-range mechanisms and this mechanism has good approximation ratio, then one of the
maximal-in-range mechanism it uses will shatter a large set. Finally, we will use results from [DSS15] to
show that shattering a large set implies inefficiency in computation or communication by reducing from hard
problems.
The results of Daniely et. al. are not such that we can apply them in a black-box manner, and we must
actually introduce and mildly generalize their techniques. We do so below.
B.1 Notations
Definition 4. ([DSS15]) (Duplicate Allocation) A d-duplicate allocation of a set X to indices Y is a
collection {Sy}y∈Y of subsets of X such that every x ∈ X belongs to at most d subsets from {Sy}y∈Y .
We use Pd(X,Y ) to denote the set of all d-duplicate allocations. If d = 1, we will use P (X,Y ).
Definition 5. (Maximal-In-Range Mechanism) Given a allocation set H ⊆ Pd(X,Y ), A maximal-in-range
(MIR or VCG-based) mechanism outputs an allocation S that maximizes
∑n
i=1 vi(Si) over all allocations in
H. The mechanism will charge the VCG price (induced by H) to each bidder to ensure truthfulness.
Definition 6. ([DSS15]) (Shattering) Let H ⊆ Pd(X,Y ). A pair of subsets S ⊆ X, A ⊆ Y is shattered by
H, if AS = HS,A. Here HS,A := {f : S → A|∃{Sy}y∈Y ∈ H ∀y ∈ A, f−1(y) = Sy ∩ S}. That is, HS,A is the
set of allocations of items in S to players in A that are projections of allocations in H onto items in S and
players in A. S and A are shattered by H if H induces every possible allocation of A to S.
Definition 7. ([DSS15]) (Generalization of VC-dimension) Let H ⊆ Y X . A is k-shattered by H if ∀a ∈ A,
∃Ya ⊆ Y of size k and the following holds: For each a ∈ A, choose ya ∈ YA arbitrarily, then no matter how
you choose these ya’s, we can find f ∈ H such that ∀a ∈ A, f(a) = ya. We define Dimk(H) as the maximal
cardinality of a k-shattered set.
Definition 8. ([DSS15]) (Approximate Containment Let H ⊆ Pd(X,Y ) and α ≥ 1. H has the α-
containment property if ∀ allocations {Sy}y∈Y of X, ∃{Ty}y∈Y ∈ H such that |{y|∅ 6= Sy ⊆ Ty}| ≥
1
α |{y|∅ 6=
Sy}|. In other words, H has the α-containment property if for any possible allocation, S, there is an allocation
T in H such that rat least a 1/α fraction of players who get something in S get in T at least what they got
in S.
Definition 9. ([DSS15]) (Approximate Intersection) Let H ⊆ Pd(X,Y ) and α ≥ 1. H has the α-
intersection property if ∀ allocations {Sy}y∈Y of X, ∃{Ty}y∈Y ∈ H such that
∑
y∈Y |Sy∩Ty| ≥
1
α
∑
y∈Y |Sy|.
B.2 Proof
We first prove the following simple lemma to show that if the first-round communication C ≤ mδ per bidder,
the protocol is choosing a truthful mechanism from exponentially many but not too many maximal-in-range
mechanisms. It is easy to get the following observations:
Observation 3. If a protocol has first-round communication mδ per bidder, then the number of possible
truthful mechanisms that can be selected for phase two is at most 2n·m
δ
.
It is easy to get the following observation from the definition of MIR mechanisms:
Observation 4. If phase two is choosing from t MIR mechanisms with sets of allocations H1, ...,Ht, then
the resulting no matter how phase one selects an MIR mechanism, the combined interpolation mechanism
does no better than the MIR mechanism with set of allocations H = ∪ti=1H
i.
By this observation, we will start to consider the MIR mechanism with set of allocations H. We are going
to show that if the MIR mechanism with set of allocations H has good approximation ratio, then one of the
maximal-in-range mechanism among H1, ...,Ht will shatter a large set. We need the generalization of the
Sauer-Shelah lemma from [DSS15]:
Theorem B.1. ([DSS15]) For every H ⊆ Y X , and every 2 ≤ k ≤ |Y |,
|H| ≤
Dimk(H)∑
i=0
(
|X |
i
)
(k − 1)|X|−i
(
|Y |
k
)i
≤ |X |Dimk(H)|Y |kDimk(H)(k − 1)|X|.
We will generalize Theorem 2.6 and Theorem 2.8 in [DSS15] as the following two theorems.
Theorem B.2. Let ǫ > 0, H1, ...,Ht ⊂ Pd(X,Y ) and H = ∪ti=1H
i. Assume that n = m1−3ǫ/4 and
t = e
m3ǫ/4
4 . If H has the m1−ǫ-containment property, then there exists i ∈ [t] and a shattered pair S ⊆ X,
A ⊆ Y of sizes Ω˜(m3ǫ/4) and mǫ/4, such that the pair S,A is shattered by HiS,A.
Proof. Let k = mǫ/4. Let {Ty}y∈Y to be a partition that is uniformly randomly chosen from all the partitions
that give mn = m
3ǫ/4 items to each index. Let A to be chosen from all the sets of indices of size k uniformly
randomly and independently from {Ty}y∈Y .
Since H has the m1−ǫ-containment property, there is a partition {Sy}y∈Y ∈ H such that Ty ⊆ Sy for at
least k y’s. We call these y’s are covered. The probability that Ty ⊆ Sy for all y ∈ A is ≥
1
(nk)
≥ 1
(mk)
≥ m−k.
By linearity of expectation, we can find a fixed set A of k indices such that with probability ≥ m−k (over
the randomness in {Ty}y∈Y ), A is covered. We fix this A.
By linearity of expectation again, there exists a set S ⊂ X and |S| = mǫ such that if we only count
A as covered when ∪y∈ATy = S, the probability that A is covered is still ≥ m
−k. Fix this S. If a
function f : S → A is uniformly randomly chosen from all functions with the property that ∀i, j ∈ A,
|f−1(i)| = |f−1(j)|, then with probability ≥ m−k, f ∈ HS,A. The number of these functions is km
ǫ
·m−ǫk,
m−ǫk comes from the fact that a random function from S to A will satisfy ∀i, j ∈ A, |f−1(i)| = |f−1(j)|
with probability m−ǫk.
Then we have |HS,A| ≥ km
ǫ
· m−k · m−ǫk. By an averaging argument, there exists i ∈ [t], such that
|HiS,A| ≥
1
t · k
mǫ ·m−k ·m−ǫk. Fix this i.
By the generalized Sauer-Shelah Lemma above, we have (note that we are using just the first inequality
in the Theorem statement, and that |Y | = k)
|HiS,A| ≤ (k − 1)
mǫ ·mǫDimk(H
i
S,A).
Then we have
mǫDimk(H
i
S,A) ≥
1
t
· (
k
k − 1
)m
ǫ
·m−k ·m−ǫk
≥ eln(1+
1
k−1 )·m
ǫ−ln t−2k ln(m)
≥ e
1
2k ·m
ǫ−m
3ǫ/4
4 −2k ln(m)
= e
m3ǫ/4
4 −2m
ǫ/4 ln(m).
By taking logarithms on both side, we have
Dimk(H
i
S,A) = Ω˜(m
3ǫ/4).
✷
Theorem B.3. Let k ≥ 2 be some integer, 0 < ǫ < 1k+1 , H
1, ...,Ht ⊂ P (X,Y ) and H = ∪ti=1H
i. Assume
n = m
1
k+1−ǫ and t = (1 + k)
m
n . If H has the m
1
k+1
−ǫ
1+2k -intersection property, then there exists i ∈ [t] and a
shattered pair S ⊆ X, A ⊆ Y of sizes m
(k+1)ǫ
log2(m)
and k, such that the pair S,A is shattered by HiS,A.
Proof. We use the following lemma from [BDF+10]
Lemma B.1. Assume H ⊆ P (X,Y ) has the ( n1+2k )-intersection property. There exists a set S ⊆ X such
that |S| ≥ km/n and |HS,Y | ≥ (1 + k)
km/n.
By this lemma, there is a set S′ ⊆ X such that |S′| ≥ km/n and |HS′,Y | ≥ (k + 1)km/n. By averaging
argument, there exists i ∈ [t] such that
|HiS′,Y | ≥
1
t
· (k + 1)km/n = (k + 1)−m/n · (k + 1)km/n
≥ (k + 1)m/n.
By generalized Sauer-Shelah Lemma, we have
(k + 1)m/n ≤ mDimk(H
i
S′,Y
) · nkDimk(H
i
S′,Y
) · (k − 1)m/n
≤ m2Dimk(H
i
S′,Y
) · (k − 1)m/n.
Taking logarithms we have
Dimk(H
i
S′,Y ) ≥
log2(
k+1
k−1 )
m
n
2 log2(m)
≥
m
2n(k − 1) log2(m)
.
Therefore, there exists a set S′′ ⊆ S′ of size m2n(k−1) log2(m)
that is k-shattered by Y . By definition of k-
shattering, let {Ya}a∈T (each Ya has size k) be a collection of subsets of Y that indicates S
′′ is k-shattered.
By averaging argument, since the total number of different Ya is at most
(
n
k
)
≤ n
k
(k−1)2 , there is a subset
S ⊆ S′′ of size
m
nk+1
log2(m)
≥
m
m1−(k+1)ǫ
log2(m)
= m
(k+1)ǫ
log2(m)
such that for all a ∈ S, Ya are the same. Let this Ya to be A,
we have that the pair S,A is shattered by HiS,A.
✷
Observation 5. ([DSS15]) H has the α containment property if and only if the MIR mechanism with set H
has an approximation ratio of α with respect to single minded valuations. H has the α intersection property
if and only if the MIR mechanism with set H has an approximation ratio of α with respect to 0/1-additive
valuations.9
By putting Observation 3, Observation 4, Observation 5, Theorem B.2 and Theorem B.3 together, we
get the following two Corollaries:
Corollary B.1. For all δ > 0, if an MIR interpolation mechanism has first round communication at most
mδ per bidder and guarantees approximation ratio m1/3−2δ/3 when all buyers are single minded, then one of
the MIR mechanisms selected for phase two maximizes over a set of allocations Hi that shatters a pair of
subsets S ⊆ [m] and A ⊆ [n] of sizes Ω˜(m1/2+δ/2) and m1/6+δ/6, respectively.
Corollary B.2. For all δ > 0, if a MIR interpolation mechanism has first round communication at most
m1/3 per bidder and guarantees approximation ratio m
1/3−δ
5 when all buyers are 0/1-additive, then one of
the MIR mechanisms selected for phase two maximizes over a set of allocations Hi that shatters a pair of
subsets S ⊆ [m] and A ⊆ [n] of sizes m
3δ
log2(m)
and 2.
Finally, these two corollaries provide the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.1: First, it is clear that both capped-additive and submodular valuations contain 0/1-
additive valuations. At a high level, the fact that Hi shatters a large pair of subsets means that any
mechanism that optimizes over Hi can solve instances over S,A exactly. If it is computationally hard (or
impossible with low communication) to optimize over sets of the corresponding sizes exactly, then it must
be the case that the MIR mechanism optimizing over Hi isn’t computationally efficient (or communication
efficient).
To prove the three bullets formally, one just needs to encode problems that are NP-hard to solve (or
require exponential communication) into welfare maximization for the appropriate valuation classes. Daniely
et. al. provides such reductions for each of the three problems, so we use exactly the same reductions as
them. We refer the reader to [DSS15] for further detail. ✷
9A valuation is 0/1-additive if it is additive with all item values either 0 or 1.
C Omitted Proofs from Section 6
In this section, we consider the computationally efficient and value query interpolation mechanisms. In
[Dob11],[DV12], they showed that if such a truthful mechanism has a good approximation ratio with respect
to submodular valuations, then its query complexity and computational complexity will be large. We will
generalize their techniques to give lower bounds in our setting.
Proof overview: Similarly as the proof in the previous section, we will first show that if the first round
communication is small, then the number of truthful mechanisms that might be run in phase two is bounded.
Then we will show that one of these truthful mechanism has a large structured submenu on a random polar
additive valuation with constant probability. The structured submenu will be defined later. Finally we will
use [Dob11] and [DV12]’s results to show that a large structured submenu implies large query complexity
and computational complexity.
C.1 Notations
For any truthful mechanism A, we use A(v)i to denote the set A gives to bidder i on valuation v and we use
pAv−i(S) denote the price A charges bidder i for getting item set S on valuation v−i. Notice the reason that
we can define the prices in this way is because of the“taxation principle” for truthful mechanisms: pAv−i(S)
does not depend on bidder i’s own declared valuation.
Definition 10. ([Dob11]) (structured submenu) A collection of sets S(A, v−i, k, p) is called a structured
submenu if
1. S(A, v−i, k, p) ⊆ {S|∃vi, A(vi, v−i)i = S}.
2. For all S ∈ S(A, v−i, k, p), |S| = k.
3. For all S ∈ S(A, v−i, k, p), p−
1
m5 < p
A
v−i(S) ≤ p.
4. For all T ∈ {S|∃vi, A(vi, v−i)i = S}, S ∈ S(A, v−i, k, p) such that T strictly contains S, pAv−i(S)+
1
m3 ≤
pAv−i(T ).
Definition 11. ([Dob11]) (polar additive valuations) A valuation v is called polar additive if
1. v is additive.
2. For each item j either v({j}) = 1 or v({j}) = 1/m3.
C.2 Proof
[Dob11, DV12] prove that any approximately optimal truthful mechanism has a large structured submenu.
We first prove the following lemma to show that if a protocol with first-round communication achieves a
good approximation, we can still find a large structured submenu.
Lemma C.1. Let m ≥ n2. Let A be an interpolation mechanism with first round communication x per
bidder. that guarantees approximation ratio n20 whenever buyers are submodular. Let t = 2
nx, and let the
t truthful mechanisms that might be selected by phase one be A1, ...,At. Let v be a polar additive valuation
randomly drawn from a distribution described in the proof. Then with probability 1− e−
m
1000 − t · e
− 2m
n2
20n , there
exists i ∈ {1, ..., n}, l ∈ {1, ..., t}, k ∈ {1, ...,m}, p ∈ [0,m], with p a multiple of 1/m5, and a structured
submenu S(Al, v−i, k, p), such that |S(Al, v−i, k, p)| ≥
e
m
n2
10n2·m7 .
Proof. We pick a random polar additive valuation v as follows: for each item j and bidder i, vi({j}) = 1
with probability 1n and otherwise vi({j}) =
1
m3 .
For each truthful mechanism Al, define
SAlv−i = {S|∃ polar additive vi, Al(vi, v−i)i = S}.
Then for all S ∈ SAlv−i , we have pv−i(S) ≤ m. This is because otherwise bidder i will prefer the empty bundle.
For all S ∈ SAlv−i , T ∈ {S|∃vi, Al(vi, v−i)i = S} and T strictly contains S, then p
Al
v−i(S)+
1
m3 ≤ p
Al
v−i(T ). This
is because each item in a polar additive valuation has value at least 1m3 . Thus if the price difference between
S and T is less than 1m3 then bidder i cannot be truthful.
Now let’s consider the following three events and prove they cannot happen at the same time:
1. D ≥ (1 − 1.1(1− 1n )
n)m where D = |{j|∃i, vi({j}) = 1}|.
2. For all i and l, the lexicographically small e
m
n2
10n2 bundles in S
Al
v−i satisfy vi(S) ≤ max{
4|S|
n +
1
m2 ,
4m
n2 +
1
m2 }.
3. For all i and l, |SAlv−i | ≤
e
m
n2
10n2 .
Now let’s see why these events cannot happen at the same time. When the first event happens, we know
that the optimal assignment will make the social welfare to be at least m(1 − 1.1e ). The second and third
event together says that for all l,i and S ∈ SAlv−i , vi(S) ≤ max{
4|S|
n +
1
m2 ,
4m
n2 +
1
m2 }. Therefore, for each Al,
consider the output of Al as Al(v)1, ..., Al(v)t. The social welfare of Al is
∑
i
vi(Al(v)i) ≤
∑
i
max{
4|Al(v)i|
n
+
1
m2
,
4m
n2
+
1
m2
}
≤ (
4m
n2
+
1
m2
) · n+
∑
|Al(v)i|>n/m
(
4|Al(v)i|
n
+
1
m2
) ≤
10m
n
Therefore the approximation ratio of Al on this valuation v is at least (m(1 −
1.1
e ))/(
10m
n ) ≥
n
20 . Since this
is true for all Al, it contradicts with the fact that A has approximation ratio
n
20 with respect to submodular
valuations.
Now let’s analyze the probability that both of the first two events to happen. For the first event, for
each item j, the probability that j is not in {j|∃i, vi({j} = 1} is (1−
1
n )
n. Therefore, by Chernoff Bound,
Pr[D < (1− 1.1(1−
1
n
)n)m] ≤ e−
0.12(1− 1
n
)nm
3 < e−
m
1000 .
For second event, fix S and i, let Di,S = |{j|j ∈ S, vi({j} = 1}|. By Chernoff Bound,
Pr[Di,S ≥
4
n
|S|] ≤ e−
32·|S|
3n = e−
3|S|
n .
It is easy to see that if vi(S) ≥
4
n |S|+
1
m2 , then Di,S ≥
4
n |S|. If |S| ≥ m/n, we have with probability at most
e−3m/n
2
, vi(S) ≥
4|S|
n +
1
m2 . If |S| < m/n, then we extend S to T such that |T | = m/n by adding items.
We know that Pr[Di,T ≥
4
n |T |] ≤ e
−3m/n2 and vi(T ) ≥ vi(S). Therefore with probability at most e−3m/n
2
,
vi(S) ≥
4m
n2 +
1
m2 . So for any S,
Pr[vi(S) > max(
4|S|
n
+
1
m2
,
4m
n2
+
1
m2
)] < e−3m/n
2
.
Thus by Union Bound, the probability that both of the first two events to happen is at least
1− e−
m
1000 − t · n ·
e
m
n2
10n2
· e−3m/n
2
= 1− e−
m
1000 − t ·
e−
2m
n2
10n
.
Therefore the third event happens with probability at most e−
m
1000 + t · e
− 2m
n2
10n . So with probability
1 − e−
m
1000 − t · e
− 2m
n2
10n , there exists i and l such that S
Al
v−i ≥
e
m
n2
10n2 . Now fix this S
Al
v−i . For each S ∈ S
Al
v−i , we
put it into bin (k, p), if |S| = k and p− 1m5 < p
Al
v−i(S) ≤ p. There are only m choices for k and m
6 choices
for p. So there are m7 bins. Therefore, one bin contains at least e
m
n2
10n2m7 elements. And from the definition
of the structured submenu, we know that this bin is a structure submenu of size at least e
m
n2
10n2m7 . ✷
Then we are going to use the following lemma from [Dob11] which shows that a large structured submenu
implies large query complexity of the mechanism.
Lemma C.2. ([Dob11]) Let A be a truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders.
Let S be a structured submenu. Then, the number of value queries A makes is at least |S| − 1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1: Similarly to observations in the previous section, phase one is choosing from at most
t = 2n×m
δ
truthful mechanisms A1, ..., At. By Lemma C.1, if we choose a random polar additive valuation,
with probability 1−e−
m
1000 −t · e
− 2m
n2
20n ≥ 1−e
− m1000 − 120n > 0 , we will get a large structured submenu for some
truthful mechanism Al. And by Lemma C.2, we know that Al has to make at least
e
m
n2
10n2m7 − 1 ≥
em
1/3
10m8 − 1
queries. This proves the first bullet.
In [DV12], their Theorem 2.1 shows that if we can get the large structured submenu of some truthful
mechanism with constant probability on a random polar additive valuation, then the truthful mechanism is
computationally inefficient unless NP = RP . Indeed, we have already showed that with constant probability
we will get a large structured submenu. Using the same technique of Theorem 2.1 [DV12], we can directly
get the second bullet as well. We refer the reader to [DV12] for further details. ✷
